Abstract. Con rmatory induction is based on the assumption that unknown individuals are similar to known ones, i.e. they satisfy the properties shared by known individuals. This assumption can be represented inside a non-monotonic logical framework. Accordingly, existing approaches to con rmatory induction take advantage of the machinery developed so far for non-monotonic inference. However, they are based on completion policies that are unnecessary strong for the induction purpose. The contribution of this paper is twofold: some basic requirements that any model for generalization based on con rmatory induction should satisfy are proposed. Then, a model for generalization based on Hempel's notion of con rmation is introduced. This model is rational in the sense that it satis es the rationality postulates we exhibit; moreover, the completion principle on which this model is based captures exactly the similarity assumption, hence the model can be considered minimal as well.
Introduction
Inductive generalization is inference of general laws from examples. It is a central concern of Machine Learning and the Philosophy of Sciences; accordingly, many researches have been devoted to it for several decades. Despite a huge amount of work on this topic, both from philosophers, logicians and AI researchers, there is no consensus on what induction precisely is. Indeed, di erent kinds of induction can easily be envisioned, and they cannot be reduced to some common ground. This diversity has been recently acknowledged by the AI community. Particularly, Flach 5] clearly points out two forms of induction, so-called explanatory induction and con rmatory induction.
Given some background knowledge Th, explanatory induction aims at generating generalizations G which deductively explain the observation report E, in the sense that in every world where Th and G are true, E is also true. Formally, we have: G^Th j = E. Contrastingly, con rmatory induction is based on the evidence that an inductive hypothesis does not necessarily need to explain some observations, but to be con rmed by them in some sense. For instance, if all what I know is that Tweety is a bird, Tweety ies, Superman ies, Gar eld is a cat and every cat is not a bird, then provided that every unknown individual behaves like the known ones (i.e. every individual possesses every property shared by both Tweety, Superman and Gar eld), Woodstock can be assumed ying whenever it is known to be a bird. Similar conclusions can be drawn with every bird. More formally, G = def 8X(bird(X) ) flies(X)) can be considered as a generalization of E = def fbird(Tweety); flies(Tweety); flies(Superman); cat(Garfield); 8X(cat(X) ) :bird(X))g:
Though G is not a logical consequence of evidence E, it is satis ed (we also say con rmed ) by every known individual.
Within con rmatory induction, there is no need to keep separate some background knowledge with the observation report; every piece of knowledge is viewed as evidence and incorporated into E. Clearly enough, E is not a logical consequence of G, hence G cannot be viewed as an explanation of E (at least, with a deductive meaning): assuming that every bird ies does not explain at all why Tweety is a bird.
While explanatory induction is commonly viewed as reversed deduction, conrmatory induction can be considered as deduction from a completed theory 14, 9] . The implicit completion of E which is performed must capture the assumption that every unknown individual is similar to the known ones, i.e. it exhibits the same properties. This induction principle is often referred to as the similarity assumption.
Viewing induction as deduction w.r.t. a completed theory allows one to put forward interesting connections with several non-monotonic inference formalisms, including the closed-world assumption 17] and its generalizations 13], Clark's completion 2] 19] and some forms of circumscription 11] 12]. Indeed, non-monotonic inference can often be considered as deduction from a completed theory. However, inductive inference is non-monotonic inference of a special kind, and it does not come down to any standard form of non-monotonic inference. Such a confusion exists in the models for con rmatory induction by 6, 10, 15, 16, 14] . All these approaches take advantage of the machinery developed for non-monotonic inference but they do not make a precise separation between the knowledge level of induction (i.e. what is a generalization?) and the inference level of induction (i.e. how to compute generalizations?). In particular, the notions of con rmation on which such approaches are based are not clearly pointed out. In our opinion, a clear separation between con rmation and generalization is necessary for a good understanding of con rmatory generalization. Moreover, the rationality issue is not addressed. Thus, some features of existing approaches are motivated by the intended notion of generalization (at the knowledge level) whereas some other ones, e.g. restrictions of the representation language, are required by the machinery used to derive generalizations (at the inference level).
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, some basic requirements that any model for generalization based on con rmatory induction should satisfy are pointed out. Second, a model for generalization based on Hempel's proposal for con rmation is presented. Both the language of evidence and the language of generalizations used in this model are more expressive than the languages used in existing approaches. Consequently, this model allows one to derive generalizations that cannot be built up using previous models for generalization; it also prevents from generating unexpected generalizations.
Rationality Postulates for Generalization
The purpose of this section is to point out some requirements that every model for generalization should satisfy. Particularly, we focus on generalization at the knowledge level.
Let us de ne a model for generalization based on con rmatory induction as
is a representation language of observation reports including eventually some background knowledge (resp. of con rmed statements, of generalizations). j is a con rmation relation between L E and L H , and j a generalization relation between L E and L G .
In such models, the notion of con rmed statement and the notion of generalization are kept separate. While con rmatory induction aims at deriving statements supported by some evidence, inductive generalization aims at pointing out general laws supported by some evidence. Thus con rmatory generalization must satisfy:
The rst postulate characterizes generalizations based on con rmatory induction. The ampliative reasoning postulate and the generality condition postulate allow one to discriminate generalizations among all con rmed statements: generalizations must convey new information, and as much information as possible.
Since inferring generalizations from evidence consists in selecting some statements among those con rmed by evidence, generalization bene ts of some rationality postulates for con rmation given by Hempel 7, 8] The other rationality postulates for con rmation proposed by Hempel and Flach cannot be kept for generalization. Ampliative reasoning requires the entailment condition and re exivity to be given up. Generality condition is not compatible with right weakening, cumulative right weakening and right AND introduction. Left OR introduction must also be rejected because it is not compatible with the similarity assumption itself; for instance, 8X; flies(X) is con rmed by flies(Superman) and by flies(Tweety), but we are not ready to consider it as con rmed by flies(Superman) _ flies(T weety) (just because 8X; flies(x) could not be derived from flies(Superman)_flies(Tweety) if the universe were reduced to fSuperman; Tweetyg).
All the requirements above do not de ne a unique model for generalization. They aim only at characterizing some properties that a rational model for generalization should satisfy. We call minimal models for generalization those relying on completion policies allowing one to capture the similarity assumption and nothing else. The completeness issue of these postulates is not addressed in this paper; while we consider that every reasonable model for generalization should satisfy these postulates, we do not claim that the converse is also the case.
Existing Approaches to Generalization are not Minimal ones
In this section, we show that existing approaches to generalization based on con rmation 6,10,15,16,14] use completion principles unnecessary strong for the induction purpose. Indeed, the similarity assumption cannot be accurately represented by the completion policies used in these approaches, even if it is embodied in them. Intuitively, the similarity assumption requires the universe to be circumscribed to known individuals, only, while completion principles used in non-monotonic inferences aim mainly at circumscribing properties of such individuals. As a consequence, these approaches can easily produce unexpected generalizations and miss interesting ones. Let us recall that Helft's model for generalization is based on subimplication 1], Marquis', Muggleton and De Raedt's, De Raedt and Dzeroski's models on inference w.r.t. minimal Herbrand model and De Raedt and Bruynooghe's on Clark's completion. These three forms of non-monotonic inference circumscribe some properties that individuals satisfy; particularly, they give to positive information a special status w.r.t. negative information: every positive ground fact which cannot be deduced from the evidence database is assumed false. Because such a completion is not always desired, unexpected generalizations can be generated. For instance, E = def forange(Garfield); bird(Tweety)g does not conrm G = def 8X; :orange(X) _ :bird(X) unless E is explicitely completed with f:orange(Tweety); :bird(Garfield)g, thanks to the closed-world assumption.
Clearly enough, such a completion formula has nothing to do with induction.
A second problem with existing approaches is that the completion of a consistent database may easily result in an inconsistent database, whatever minimal models 6,10,16,14] or Clark's completion 15] are used. In order to deal with this problem, the representation languages of evidence and generalizations are restricted in the approaches mentioned above. Once again, such restrictions are not required by the similarity assumption. They may lead one to miss some interesting generalizations. For instance, none of the approaches above allows one to consider 8X; orange(X) _ bird(X) as a generalization of orange(Garfield) _ bird(Tweety).
A Model for Generalization based on Hempel's Notion of Con rmation
In this section, a model for generalization hL E ; L H ; L G ; j ; j i is pointed out. It satis es the requirements stated in Section 2 and is minimal as well. Interestingly, it does not su er from the impediments described above.
Con rmation
The notion of con rmation on which our model is based is close to those proposed by Hempel 7] . Intuitively, E con rms H if and only if E would entail H if the universe were reduced to the set of individuals appearing in E. In other words, E con rms H whenever H is a logical consequence of E under the similarity assumption. Because no additional assumptions are taken into account, the models for generalization based on such a notion of con rmation can be considered as minimal ones.
De nitions. In order to gure out what the universe would be when restricted to known individuals, Hempel introduced the concept of development of a formula for a nite class of individual constants:
De nition 1. The development of a rst-order formula H for a nite class of individual constants C, noted D C (H), is inductively de ned as follows:
where H x c] is the formula which results from replacing in H every free occurrence of x by c.
In our approach, we consider the Herbrand domain of E, i.e. the set C E of all constant symbols occurring in E as the set of known individuals. For instance, the development of the formula H = def 8X(bird(X) ) flies(X)) for the Herbrand domain of E = def fbird(Tweety); flies(Tweety); flies(Superman); cat(Garfield); 8X(cat(X) ) :bird(X))g is the ground formula (bird(T weety) ) flies(Tweety)) (bird(Superman) ) flies(Superman) (bird(Garf ield) ) flies(Garfield)):
. This ground formula represents the same information than H provided that the universe is reduced to fTweety; Superman; Garfieldg. De nition 2. L E is the language of universal formulas of function-free rstorder logic without equality such that at least one constant symbol occurs in the representation of any observation report, i.e. the Herbrand domain of any E is nite and non-empty. We also impose that L H = L E .
De nition 3. Let E 2 L E and H 2 L H s.t. C H C E . E j H if and only if E j = D CE (H). In our approach, hypothesis H is con rmed by evidence E whenever H can be deduced from E under the similarity assumption. Accordingly, this notion of con rmation can be considered as a re nement of Flach's consistency-based con rmation 3, 4] , where E and H are only required to be consistent alltogether.
The various restrictions put on L E and L H are motivated as follows. First, if empty Herbrand domains were allowed (e.g. 8X; flies(X) is considered as an admissible evidence), then con rmed statements which are inconsistent with the corresponding evidence could be easily derived (e.g. 8X; :flies(X) is con rmed by 8X; flies(X) since the development of 8X; :flies(X) for the empty Herbrand domain is true). This would violate the consistency condition. The absence of equality in the language allows one to reject evidence like E = def 8X; (X 6 = Superman). Indeed, since the development of H = def 8X; (X = Superman) for fSupermang is Superman = Superman, which must be considered true in every rst-order language with equality, H would be con rmed by E. Once again, the consistency condition would be violated. A similar problem would occur with E = def 9X; :flies(X)^flies(Superman) and H = def 8X; flies(X)
if existential formulas were accepted in the language of evidence. This is why this is not the case. Finally, the Herbrand domain of con rmed statements H is required to be included in the Herbrand domain of the corresponding evidence E, so as to avoid the happening of miraculously generated individuals in con rmed statements.
Hempel's Con rmation. Though the con rmation relation above is close to Hempel's proposal 8], it di ers from it in several ways. First, our notion of con rmation corresponds to Hempel's direct con rmation. We do not consider con rmation de ned by extending direct con rmation with logical consequence, as Hempel did to satisfy the entailment condition, because this postulate is not compatible with the ampliative reasoning postulate (cf. Section 2). Additionally, we do not impose H to be valid whenever D CE (H) is valid; for instance, given E = def flies(Tweety) and H = def 8X; flies(X)_8X; :flies(X), we consider that the fact that D CE (H) = flies(Tweety) _ :flies(Tweety) is valid, while H is not, does not prevent E from con rming H. Finally, assimilating known individuals with the Herbrand domain of evidence imposes to consider E 1 = def flies(Superman)^(flies(Superman) _ flies(Tweety)) and E 2 = def flies(Superman) as two di erent evidences. Indeed, while these two formulas are logically equivalent, they do not convey the same information w.r.t. individuals of the domain: from the rst one, we want to conclude that two individuals belong to the domain. Such a distinction has a signi cant in uence on the con rmatory relation: in our model, H = 8X; flies(X)
is considered as con rmed by E 2 but not by E 1 ; as a consequence, left logical equivalence is satis ed by j if we consider that two formulas are equivalent if and only if they are logically equivalent and share the same Herbrand domain, i.e they are logically equivalent under the domain-closure axiom and the unique name axiom. Hempel addressed this problem di erently by considering only the essential constants of E, i.e. constants of E that must occur in every formula logically equivalent to E 8].
Generalization
De nition 4. As a representation language L G for generalizations, we consider the language of con rmed statements L H , restricted to universal clauses. This last restriction could be easily given up but we take it because clausal theories are easy to understand. Moreover, it is helpful at the inference level. Excluding the equality symbol from the language of generalizations is necessary to avoid considering as a generalization the domain-closure axiom which is always con rmed since it is implicit in the logic. are satis ed by j . Obviously, j satis es the rst three postulates (con rmatory foundation, ampliative reasoning and generality condition). Veri cation and falsi cation principles and cautious monotonicity also hold. The consistency condition is satis ed as well (the proof is similar to the one proposed by Hempel in 7] ). Right equivalence is a consequence of properties of the development of a universal formula for a nite class of individual constants also proved by Hempel 7] . Finally, left equivalence holds provided that logical equivalence over the same Herbrand domain is considered.
Generalizations G are derived thanks to a generate-and-test search strategy. Especially, a candidate formula for generalization is rst generated, then checked for generalization. Such a generate-and-test approach is also used in all existing techniques. So as to promote the production of most general clauses rst, the language of generalizations is searched w.r.t. subsumption ordering. The search can be realised through iterative deepening or a variant of SE-tree search 18] for a rst-order logic language without functional symbols. The search can also be constrained by focusing on clauses built up exclusively from a user-de ned set of predicates, or by limiting the number of literals in generalizations.
Given the database fbird(Tweety); cartoon(Tweety); flies(Superman); cartoon(Superman)g, Claudien, the system described in 15], produces the set of generalizations:
f8X; :bird(X) _ :flies(X); 8X; :bird(X) _ cartoon(X); 8X; :flies(X) _ cartoon(X); 8X; :cartoon(X) _ bird(X) _ flies(X)g. Contrastingly, our model gives the set:f8X; cartoon(X); 8X; bird(X)_flies(X)g.
Clearly enough, the clauses generated thanks to our model are more general ones; moreover, the unexpected generalization 8X; :bird(X) _ :flies(X) is avoided in our approach.
